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Fingerprinting is a technique in communication complexity in which two parties (Alice and Bob)
with large data sets send short messages to a third party (a referee), who attempts to compute
some function of the larger data sets. For the equality function, the referee attempts to determine
whether Alice’s data and Bob’s data are the same. In this paper, we consider the extreme scenario
of performing fingerprinting where Alice and Bob both send either one bit (classically) or one qubit
(in the quantum regime) messages to the referee for the equality problem. Restrictive bounds are
demonstrated for the error probability of one-bit fingerprinting schemes, and show that it is easy to
construct one-qubit fingerprinting schemes which can outperform any one-bit fingerprinting scheme.
The author hopes that this analysis will provide results useful for performing physical experiments,
which may help to advance implementations for more general quantum communication protocols.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Fingerprinting is a useful mechanism for computing
functions of large and distributed sets of data, by send-
ing short messages called ‘fingerprints’ of the data to a
third party for computation. The aim is to reduce the
amount of communication, at the cost of some manage-
able probability of error.
The notion of fingerprinting arises naturally in the set-
ting of communication complexity (see [1]). In the simul-
taneous message passing model, which was introduced by
Yao in his original paper on communication complex-
ity [2], two parties (Alice and Bob) each have a piece
of data represented by a string (α for Alice and β for
Bob). They wish to compute some function f of their
strings, f(α, β). However, we constrain Alice and Bob in
the following way: they may not communicate with one
another, but they may each send one message to a third
party (a referee) who will attempt to compute f(α, β)
using messages sent by Alice and Bob. It is assumed
that Alice, Bob, and the referee have established some
protocol which describes:
• how Alice and Bob choose messages to send to the
referee depending on their strings, and
• how the referee interprets the messages in order to
attempt to compute f(α, β).
In our scenario, we are assuming Alice and Bob do not
have access to a common source of random bits. A sim-
ple protocol in which Alice and Bob simply transmit (a
binary representation of) their entire strings will suffice.
The question that is asked is: how great a probability of
success can they attain if they each transmit less infor-
mation to the referee? We refer to the shorter messages
that Alice and Bob send as fingerprints of their data.
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In the case where Alice and Bob wish to compare their
strings for equality, we may use f(α, β) = δαβ , which
evaluates to 0 if α = β and 1 otherwise.
Performing fingerprinting using quantum information
was first investigated for the asymptotic case in [3]. In
that paper, it was shown that fingerprints of length
O(log n) suffice for determining whether or not two n-
bit strings are equal, with an error probability less than
ε (for any constant ε > 0). This contrasts with the classi-
cal case, where it is known that fingerprints of size Ω(
√
n)
are necessary for comparable performance [4]. The result
of [3] is part of a sequence of results including [5, 6], where
it has been shown that communication complexity can be
reduced using quantum communication. Although these
results demonstrate asymptotic savings, they do not ex-
plicitly demonstrate savings in small instances that might
be suitable for experimental implementations in order to
verify the theory. For example, it is not clear that the
significant quantum/classical communication separations
shown in [5] and [6] hold for particularly small problem-
size instances.
In this paper, we examine very small instances of fin-
gerprinting. Specifically, if Alice and Bob may only trans-
mit one bit (or one qubit) of information to the referee,
what can we say about the probability of success in de-
termining whether α = β ? By analysing these very lim-
ited instances of the quantum fingerprinting problem, we
hope to provide results which will be easily tested by ex-
periment, in order to help the development of implemen-
tations for more general quantum communication proto-
cols.
It should be noted that Massar [7] proposed a single
particle fingerprinting scheme, in which a particle is sent
either to Alice or to Bob (in superposition). Each party
induces a relative phase on the state of the particle, af-
ter which the two paths are interfered with one another.
This scenario differs from the one considered here — for
example, Alice and Bob share quantum information (the
path taken by the particle) in addition to their input
data (α and β), whereas no such additional information
2is available in the present scenario.
II. PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS
Let S be the set of possible strings that Alice and Bob
may have. We consider cases where |S| > 2 (cases with
|S| 6 2 are of course trivial to solve with one bit of
communication).
Definition 1. Given the one (qu)bit messages from Al-
ice and Bob, the referee will make a declaration (correct
or incorrect) about whether or not their strings match.
• If the referee declares that the strings match, we
say that his decision strategy accepts the input it
was given, and we call this a positive result; if this
declaration is incorrect, we may call this a false
positive.
• If the referee declares that the strings differ, we
say that his decision strategy rejects the input it
was given, and we call this a negative result; if this
declaration is incorrect, we may call this a false
negative.
Definition 2. Here are some definitions related to error
probabilities.
• For a given fingerprinting scheme, the error prob-
ability of the scheme will refer to the worst-case
probability of an incorrect result in that scheme.
• A fingerprinting scheme with one-sided error is one
where, if Alice and Bob have the same data string,
the probability that the scheme will produce a false
negative is zero.
III. CLASSICAL ONE-BIT FINGERPRINTING
In this section, we provide the definition of a one-bit
fingerprinting scheme, and show that such schemes have
quite limited power. Specifically, any one-bit fingerprint-
ing scheme has an error probability of at least 12 (which
is the same error probability that results from just a fair
coin flip by the referee). As well, any one-bit fingerprint-
ing scheme with one-sided error has error probability 1
(the same error probability that results if the referee al-
ways declares that the strings match). Finally, any one-
bit fingerprinting scheme that succeeds with high prob-
ability when Alice’s and Bob’s strings match necessarily
fails with high probability in Θ(|S|2) of the cases where
their strings do not match.
Definition 3. A one-bit fingerprinting scheme P op-
erates as follows. To begin with, Alice and Bob receive
inputs α, β ∈ S, respectively. Each of them sends one bit
to the referee, who produces an output bit based on these
two messages. Each party may use a probabilistic strat-
egy; however, there is no shared randomness among the
parties. Such a scheme is characterised by three proba-
bility distributions:
• Alice’s fingerprinting strategy {pσ}σ∈S , where pα is
the probability with which Alice sends the message
1, depending on her string α ∈ S .
• Bob’s fingerprinting strategy {qσ}σ∈S , where qβ is
the probability with which Bob sends the message
1, depending on his string β ∈ S .
• The referee’s decision strategy {r00, r01, r10, r11},
where rab is the probability with which the referee
declares a positive result, depending on the bits a
and b sent to him by Alice and Bob respectively.
Definition 4. For any one-bit fingerprinting scheme P ,
define the function
P+(α, β) = (1 − pα)(1− qβ)r00 + (1− pα)qβr01
+ pα(1− qβ)r10 + pαqβr11 . (1)
That is, P+(α, β) is the probability that the scheme P
yields a positive result when the input to Alice is α and
to Bob is β .
We will usually want to place lower bounds on the
probability of a positive result when α = β . This will
have a strong impact on the overall performance of the
scheme P . In order to simplify analysis, it will be useful
to come up with a simple inequality.
Lemma 1. For any one-bit fingerprinting scheme P, it
is possible to define real-valued parameters xα , yβ , and
dε (depending on α, β ∈ S and ε ∈ [0, 1] respectively)
such that
xα yβ > dε ⇐⇒ P+(α, β) > (1− ε) . (2)
Proof — Let α, β ∈ S be strings such that P+(α, β) >
(1−ε) holds. We may expand the expression of P+(α, β)
in Equation 1 as a polynomial in pα and qβ: this gives us
(r00−r01 − r10 + r11)pαqβ + (r10 − r00)pα
+ (r01 − r00)qβ + r00 > (1 − ε) . (3)
We would like to separate the dependency on α and β:
how we may do this depends on the value of c = (r00 −
r01 − r10 + r11) .
• If c 6= 0, we may define the parameters xα , yβ , and
dε as follows:
xα = c
(
pα +
r01 − r00
c
)
yβ = qβ +
r10 − r00
c
dε = (1− ε) + (r00 − r01)(r00 − r10)
c
− r00 .
(4)
Then, the inequality xα yβ > dε holds, as it is equiv-
alent to Equation 3.
3• If c = 0, we may drop the cross-term in pα and qβ
from Equation 3:
(r10 − r00)pα + (r01 − r00)qβ
+ r00 > (1 − ε) .
(5)
As the exponential function (x 7−→ ex) is mono-
tone increasing, the inequality will be preserved if
we exponentiate both sides. Doing this yields
e(r10−r00) pα e(r01−r00) qβ er00 > e1− ε . (6)
In this case, we may define the parameters xα , yβ ,
and dε as follows:
xα = e
(r10−r00) pα
yβ = e
(r01−r00) qβ
dε = e
1− ε− r00 .
(7)
Then, we have the inequality xα yβ > dε .
In both cases, the parameters are defined so that if
P(α, β) > (1− ε) , the inequality xα yβ > dε holds. For
the converse, suppose that xα yβ > dε for two particular
strings α, β ∈ S. By simply applying the definitions of
xα , yβ , and dε (and taking the logarithms of both sides
if c = 0), we can immediately recover Equation 3. Thus,
the converse holds as well. 
The parameters xα, yβ, and dε do not necessarily re-
fer to any obvious properties of the scheme P . How-
ever, using them, we may easily prove very restrictive
upper bounds on the effectiveness of one-bit fingerprint-
ing schemes:
Theorem 1. Let P be a one-bit fingerprinting scheme.
If ε is an upper bound for the worst-case probability that
P produces false negatives, then (1− ε) is a lower bound
on the worst-case probability that P will produce false
positives.
Proof — Because the probability of a false negative
is at most ε, we have P+(σ, σ) > (1 − ε) for all strings
σ ∈ S. Then, by Lemma 1, we also have xσ yσ > dε for
all σ ∈ S. Consider an alternative definition of the ‘sign’
function:
sgnxσ =
{
1 , xσ > 0
−1 , xσ < 0
. (8)
As there are two possible values for the ‘sign’ function,
and more than two elements in S, there must then be
at least two distinct strings µ, ν ∈ S such that sgnxµ =
sgnxν . Without loss of generality, we may choose µ and
ν such that (sgnxν) yν > (sgnxµ) yµ. Then we have
xµ yν > xµ yµ > dε . (9)
Again by Lemma 1, we then know that P+(µ, ν) >
(1− ε). As µ and ν were chosen to be distinct, the worst-
case probability of a false positive for the fingerprinting
scheme P is then at least (1− ε). 
Corollary 1-1. Any one-bit fingerprinting scheme has
error probability at least 12 .
Corollary 1-2. Any one-sided error one-bit finger-
printing scheme has error probability 1.
Not only are there lower bounds on the worst-case
probability of failure, but there is also a lower bound
on the number of inputs which are likely to produce a
false positive:
Theorem 2. Let P be a one-bit fingerprinting scheme,
and let |S| = s. If the worst-case probability of obtaining
a false negative is at most ε > 0 in P, then the number
of inputs (α, β) ∈ S×S such that α 6= β and P+(α, β) >
(1− ε) is at least 14 (s2 − 2s).
Proof sketch — This follows by considering the argu-
ments from Theorem 1. We may establish a lower bound
by counting the number of unordered pairs {α, β} such
that sgnxα = sgnxβ and α 6= β. This is minimized if
nearly half of the strings σ ∈ S have sgnxσ = 1, and
nearly half again have sgnxσ = −1. If this is the case, a
simple counting argument shows that the number of such
(unordered) pairs is 2
(
s/2
2
)
= 14 (s
2 − 2s) for s even, and(
(s+1)/2
2
)
+
(
(s−1)/2
2
)
= 14 (s
2 − 2s+ 1) for s odd. 
So, one is forced to accept one of two scenarios in a one-
bit fingerprinting scheme: one must either forego a rea-
sonable upper bound on the probability of error when Al-
ice’s and Bob’s strings match, or use a scheme which will
produce false positives with high probability for about
1
4 or more of Alice’s and Bob’s possible inputs (strictly
more than the number of matching cases when |S| > 6 ).
IV. QUANTUM ONE-QUBIT
FINGERPRINTING
In this section, we provide the definition of a one-
qubit fingerprinting scheme, give examples of one-qubit
schemes that outperform what classical one-bit finger-
printing schemes can achieve, and give some upper and
lower bounds for the performance of schemes with one-
sided error.
Definition 5. A one-qubit fingerprinting scheme Q op-
erates as follows. To begin with, Alice and Bob receive
inputs α, β ∈ S, respectively. Then each of them sends
one qubit to the referee, who produces an output bit
based on these two qubits. There is no a priori shared
information among the parties. Such a scheme is charac-
terized by three components:
• Alice’s message set {ρσ}σ∈S , where ρα is the one-
qubit (possibly mixed) state that Alice will prepare
and send to the referee, depending on her string α.
• Bob’s message set {τσ}σ∈S , where τβ is the one-
qubit (possibly mixed) state that Bob will prepare
and send to the referee, depending on his string β.
4• The referee’s decision strategy, which is some two-
outcome measurement of the two-qubit state ρα ⊗
τβ , possibly using some finite number of ancilliary
qubits.
The inputs recieved by the referee fall into two classes:
matching states, which are states of the form ρσ ⊗ τσ
for some σ ∈ S, and hybrid states, which are states of
the form ρα ⊗ τβ for α 6= β. The goal of the referee
is essentially to attempt to distinguish matching states
from hybrid states.
A. Some one-qubit fingerprinting schemes
In this section, we give examples of one-qubit finger-
printing schemes that outperform any possible classical
one-bit scheme.
The basic framework that we use for constructing fin-
gerprinting schemes is that of [3]: construct a set of pure
fingerprint states with small pairwise inner product and
then apply a controlled-swap test.
Theorem 3. Let Q be a fingerprinting scheme with the
following characteristics:
• Alice and Bob both use the same set of pure states{ |φσ〉}
σ∈S as fingerprints, such that for all α, β ∈
S with α 6= β,
∣∣ 〈φα |φβ〉 ∣∣ 6 δ ;
• The referee’s decision strategy is to compute the
state
(H ⊗ I ⊗ I)c-swap (H ⊗ I ⊗ I) |0〉 |φα〉 |φβ〉 , (10)
measure the first qubit, and declare a negative result
iff the result is 1.
Then Q is a one-sided error fingerprinting scheme, with
error probability at most 1+δ
2
2 .
Using this framework for one-qubit fingerprinting
schemes, the task is to find sets of one-qubit fingerprint
states such that their pairwise inner product is as small
as possible. Using the Bloch sphere representation for
qubit states, this reduces to finding points on the Bloch
sphere which are as widely separated as possible. For in-
stance, for |S| = 4, one would use the vertices of a regular
tetrahedron inscribed within the Bloch sphere, such as
|φ0〉 = |0〉
|φ1〉 = 1√3
(
|0〉 +
√
2 |1〉
)
|φ2〉 = 1√3
(
|0〉 + e2pii/3
√
2 |1〉
)
|φ3〉 = 1√3
(
|0〉 + e4pii/3
√
2 |1〉
)
.
The inner product of any two of these states is 1√
3
in ab-
solute value. Similarly, for |S| = 3 one would use the ver-
tices of an equilateral triangle, and for |S| = 6 one would
use the vertices of a regular octahedron. The (maxi-
mal) absolute value of the inner product of two states
are 12 and
1√
2
, respectively, in the latter two cases. For
|S| = s ≫ 1, there exists a collection of s states whose
maximal pairwise inner product is 1 − O(1s ) in absolute
value (this may be shown using a simple geometric ar-
gument, by considering the area available to be used in
distributing the states on the Bloch sphere).
Using these figures for the magnitude of the inner prod-
uct in various cases, we may use Theorem 3 to construct
fingerprinting schemes with one sided error, each of which
outperforms any possible one-bit fingerprinting scheme
with one-sided error. The error probabilities for these
schemes are presented in Table I, below.
Any one-sided error fingerprinting scheme with error
probability ε can be converted into a general (two-sided
error) scheme with error probability ε1+ε , as follows. Af-
ter running the one-sided error scheme, if the result is
positive, we change the result to negative with proba-
bility ε1+ε . It is straightforward to verify that the re-
sulting (two-sided) error probability will be ε1+ε . Using
this observation, we can determine the error probabilties
for one-qubit fingerprinting schemes with two-sided er-
ror, each of which again outperforms any possible one-bit
fingerprinting scheme with two-sided error. These error
probabilities are also presented in Table I.
Maximal Error probability Error probability
|S|
inner product (1-sided error) (2-sided error)
3 1
2
5
8
= 0.625 5
13
≈ 0.385
4 1√
3
2
3
≈ 0.667 2
5
= 0.400
6 1√
2
3
4
= 0.750 3
7
≈ 0.429
s≫ 1 1−O( 1
s
) 1−O( 1
s
) 1
2
−O( 1
s
)
TABLE I: For |S| = 3, 4, 6, and the asymptotic case s ≫
1, the error probabilities for some one-qubit fingerprinting
schemes in the framework of [3].
Note that the one-sided error probabilities are all
strictly less than 1, and the two-sided error probabilities
are all strictly less than 12 , neither of which are possible
for one-bit fingerprinting schemes (by Corollary 1-2 and
Corollary 1-1 respectively).
B. Error probabilities in one-qubit fingerprinting
schemes
In this section, we give some upper and lower bounds
on the error probabilities of one-qubit fingerprinting
schemes with one-sided error. In doing so, we obtain re-
sults which imply that when Alice’s choice of fingerprint
states is evenly distributed on the Bloch sphere, the op-
timal one-qubit scheme is symmetric (that is, where Al-
ice and Bob use the same fingerprint states). We also
show that there are choices of fingerprint states for Alice
5where a symmetric scheme is not optimal, and discuss
necessary conditions which must hold for a symmetric
scheme to be a sub-optimal choice. These results suggest
that for even such a small instance of quantum finger-
printing, the question of finding an optimal scheme for
a fixed value |S| is not simple: in particular, analysis in
the general case does not lend itself to simple arguments
by symmetry.
It will be useful to define some additional notation.
Throughout this section, for a one-qubit fingerprinting
scheme Q, we represent the worst-case probability of a
false negative by W−Q , and the worst-case probability of
a false positive by W+Q .
1. One-qubit fingerprinting with one-sided error
As we saw in section III, a one-bit fingerprinting
scheme with one-sided error will have an error probability
of 1. Because we have no interest in one-qubit schemes
with this error probability, we will use the following ter-
minology:
Definition 6. A fingerprinting scheme is strict if it
has one-sided error (W−Q = 0) and an error probability
strictly less than 1 (W+Q < 1).
In a strict one-qubit fingerprinting scheme Q, the ref-
eree’s decision strategy must accept any matching state
ρσ ⊗ τσ (for σ ∈ S). This leads to a natural definition:
Definition 7. The accept space AQ of a one-qubit fin-
gerprinting scheme Q is the set of two-qubit pure states
|γ〉, such that the referee’s decision strategy would pro-
duce a positive result with certainty if it were provided
the input |γ〉 (regardless of whether |γ〉 is a product of
fingerprint states from Alice and Bob).
The accept space is a vector space: if the referee’s
strategy accepts two distinct two-qubit states |γ〉 and
|γ′〉 with certainty, by linearity it must accept any linear
combination of |γ〉 and |γ′〉.
In order to be accepted with certainty, each matching
state must be a (possibly trivial) mixture of states in the
accept space. So, it is natural to try to understand a
fingerprinting scheme Q in terms of AQ . One question
which bears interest is how large the accept space can be
for a strict one-qubit fingerprinting scheme.
Theorem 4. If Q is a strict one-qubit fingerprinting
scheme, then dimAQ = 3.
Proof sketch — First, it is useful to note that nei-
ther Alice nor Bob can use one fingerprint state for two
distinct data strings: this would lead immediately to the
existence of a matching state (which must be accepted
with certainty) which is identical with some hybrid state
(which must not be accepted with certainty). So, each of
Alice’s fingerprint states must be distinct from one an-
other, and similarly for Bob. We may then prove the the-
orem by eliminating every other possible value of dimAQ.
The fact that both Alice and Bob must use distinct fin-
gerprints for distinct input strings implies dimAQ > 1 .
Using arguments of linear independence, it is possible to
show that if Alice or Bob use mixed states for finger-
prints, then dimAQ > 2 . On the other hand, if Alice
uses the pure states |φσ〉 and Bob uses the pure states
|ψσ〉 for σ ∈ S, we can determine that dimAQ > 2 from
the fact that the equation
|φω〉 |ψω〉 = c1 |φµ〉 |ψµ〉+ c2 |φν〉 |ψν〉
cannot be satisfied for any c1 , c2 ∈ C for any three strings
µ, ν, ω ∈ S (the state on the left-hand side being both
a product state and linearly independent from both of
the states on the right-hand side individually). Finally,
because there must be a non-zero probability of rejecting
hybrid states, we must have dimAQ < 4 . Thus we have
dimAQ = 3, as required. 
This restriction on the nature of AQ has some strong
implications about what states Alice and Bob may use
for fingerprints. The simplest is as follows:
Theorem 5. In a strict one-qubit fingerprinting
scheme, Alice and Bob must use pure states for finger-
print states.
This result is easy to demonstrate: the proof can be
found in the appendix. On the other hand, this result
is not clearly trivial — without this theorem, there is no
immediately obvious reason to exclude mixed quantum
fingerprinting schemes, even for reasons of optimality.
(In the classical scheme where we allow arbitrary length
fingerprints, [8] provides a mixed fingerprinting strategy
which provides optimal performance for a classical finger-
printing scheme.) In consideration of Theorem 5, we will
use the pure state |φσ〉 to describe Alice’s fingerprint for
σ ∈ S, and |ψσ〉 to describe Bob’s fingerprints, for σ ∈ S,
in any strict one-qubit fingerprinting scheme.
For a strict scheme Q, we may consider the set of two-
qubit states which are perfectly distinguishable from the
matching states. Because the accept space defined by
the matching states is of dimension 3, there will be pre-
cisely one such state, which we denote by |RQ〉. Being
orthogonal to the accept space, it is the two-qubit state
which the referee’s decision strategy would be most likely
to reject. As a result, we call |RQ〉 the reject state of
Q. Although it is possible for the referee’s strategy to
accept the state |RQ〉 with non-zero probability, an opti-
mal choice of decision strategy for the referee is to reject
|RQ〉 with certainty.
Theorem 6. Let C be a (non-empty) collection of
strict one-qubit fingerprinting schemes, characterized by
some choice of fingerprint states
{ |φσ〉}
σ∈S for Alice and{ |ψσ〉}
σ∈S for Bob. Let A be the accept space defined by
these fingerprint states, and |R〉 the corresponding reject
state. Then for any Q ∈ C ,
W+Q > 1 − minα6=β
∣∣∣ 〈R| ( |φα〉 ⊗ |ψβ〉)∣∣∣2 , (11)
6with equality when the referee’s decision strategy is to
project |φα〉 |ψβ〉 either into A or onto |R〉 using a mea-
surement, returning a negative result iff the result of this
measurement is |R〉.
Proof — That the strategy described above yields a
strict one-qubit fingerprinting scheme is trivial: we will
show that this is the optimal decision strategy for the
referee. Whatever the referee’s decision strategy may be,
it must attempt to distinguish between the hybrid states
and the accept space without having specific knowledge
about the input he receives. Any such strategy can be
described by a two-valued POVM {E+ , E−} , where E+
and E− corresponds positive and negative results respec-
tively. For any state |ψ〉 ∈ A, we require
tr (E− |ψ 〉〈ψ| ) = 0 , (12)
which implies E− = p |R 〉〈R| for some probability p > 0.
Then, the POVM which describes the referee’s strategy
is equivalent to a partial projective measurement (either
onto the the state |R〉 or into the space A), followed by
a biased coin-flip to decide whether to produce a neg-
ative result should the state collapse to |R〉. In order
to achieve the greatest probability of distinguishing hy-
brid states from the accept space, we may choose to fix
p = 1. The strategy that we obtain is then precisely the
one described by the theorem. 
The reject state can be a useful tool for analysis. For
instance, consider the Schmidt decomposition of |RQ〉,
which can be expressed as
|RQ〉 = 1√1+C2
( |η0〉 |κ0〉 − C |η1〉 |κ1〉) (13)
for some orthonormal bases
{ |η0〉 , |η1〉} and{ |κ0〉 , |κ1〉} of C2, and some real coefficient C > 0 .
(Because Alice and Bob are not allowed to use the
same fingerprint state for different strings, it is simple
to show that C 6= 0 , and we may absorb any relative
phase into the definitions of |η1〉 and |κ1〉 .) Let
U = |0〉〈η0| + |1〉〈η1| and V = |1〉〈κ0| + |0〉〈κ1| . Then,
we have
(U ⊗ V ) |RQ〉 = 1√1+C2
( |01〉 − C |10〉) (14)
As a part of his decision strategy, the referee can per-
form the transformation U ⊗ V as the first step, without
loss of generality. However, because U ⊗ V can also be
carried out without communication by Alice and Bob
as the last part of the preparation of their fingerprint
states, Q is equivalent to a different one-qubit scheme
Q′, where Alice and Bob use the fingerprints U |φσ〉 and
V |ψσ〉 (respectively) for the string σ ∈ S rather than
|φσ〉 and |ψσ〉 , and where the reject state is (U⊗V ) |RQ〉
rather than |RQ〉. For the sake of brevity, we will call a
strict scheme Q canonical if the reject state is given by
|RQ〉 = 1√1+C2
( |01〉 − C |10〉) for some C > 0. For any
strict scheme Q , we will call the canonical fingerprinting
scheme which is equivalent to Q the canonical form of
Q.
Given the canonical form of Q , we can easily describe
a relation between Alice’s and Bob’s fingerprint states.
We can express |φσ〉 and |ψσ〉 in the form
|φσ〉 = 1√
1+|uσ|2
(
|0〉+ uσ |1〉
)
|ψσ〉 = 1√
1+|wσ|2
(
|0〉+ wσ |1〉
)
,
(15)
for some complex constants us , ws ∈ C. (For |φσ〉 =
|1〉 , we may take the limit |uσ| → ∞ , and similarly for
|ψσ〉 .)1 Using the expression in Equation 14 for |RQ〉 ,
from 〈RQ|
( |φσ〉 ⊗ |ψσ〉) = 0, we can then determine
wσ 〈01 |01〉 − Cuσ 〈10 |10〉 = 0
=⇒ wσ = Cuσ .
(16)
(This equation extends appropriately in the limit
|uσ| , |wσ| → ∞ in the sense that |φσ〉 |ψσ〉 will approach
|11〉 , which is an element of AQ.) Then, if the reject state
|RQ〉 of a strict one-qubit scheme Q is known, one can
determine Bob’s fingerprints from Alice’s fingerprints, us-
ing the canonical form of Q. One can then characterize
a strict one-qubit fingerprinting protocol by its’ reject
state |RQ〉 , the probability with which the referee re-
jects |RQ〉 , and Alice’s choice of fingerprint states.
Using this observation, we can also determine useful
information about a strict one-qubit scheme from only
Alice’s or only Bob’s fingerprint states, along with the
parameter C used to define the reject state.
Theorem 7. Let Q be a strict one-qubit fingerprint-
ing scheme, where Alice’s fingerprint states are given
by
{ |φσ〉}
σ∈S and Bob’s fingerprint states are given by{ |ψσ〉}
σ∈S . For the sake of brevity, define the hybrid
state |hαβ〉 = |φα〉 |ψβ〉 for each α 6= β. Then, there is a
collection of positive real constants {Kσ}σ∈S such that∣∣ 〈RQ |hαβ〉 ∣∣2 = Kβ (1 − ∣∣ 〈φβ |φα〉 ∣∣2) , (17)
for all α, β ∈ S.
With this result, knowledge of the constants Kσ for
σ ∈ S allows one to easily determine the probability that
any hybrid state will be projected onto |RQ〉 , using only
Alice’s fingerprints. The proof of Theorem 7 is left to the
appendix; for schemes Q in canonical form, the parame-
ter Kσ can be given as a function of C, and the extended
real number uσ which defines Alice’s state |φσ〉 :
Kσ =
C2
(
1 + |uσ|2
)
(
1 + C2 |uσ|2
)(
1 + C2
) (18)
1 To ensure that this is meaningful, we take care to observe that
expressions involving |uσ| and |wσ| extend in an appropriate way
under this limit.
7(As |uσ| → ∞ , this formula converges to 11+C2 .) It is
easy to show that, as a function of |uσ| ,Kσ is constant for
C = 1 , monotone increasing for C < 1 , and monotone
decreasing for C > 1 . Of particular interest is the locus
of possible values of uσ where Kσ =
1
2 : it is simple to
show that for any value of C, this set of points will be
the circle of radius C−1 about the origin.
By considering this formula for Kσ , we can begin to
try finding an optimal strict fingerprinting scheme (by
optimising the value of C) based on Alice’s fingerprint
states, and vice-versa. We will describe some ideas of
how this may be done in the following section.
2. Strict symmetric fingerprinting schemes
Fingerprinting schemes where Alice and Bob use the
same states as each other for their fingerprints are a nat-
ural class of fingerprinting schemes to consider. All of
the results obtained in the previous section hold for the
special case of strict symmetric one-qubit fingerprinting
schemes: in this section, we will elaborate on some of the
results for this special case, and discuss when a symmet-
ric scheme is an optimal choice of one-qubit fingerprinting
scheme.
It is easy to verify that, for a symmetric scheme,
|RQ〉 = |Ψ−〉. Theorem 6 then effectively reproduces
the controlled-swap decision strategy of Theorem 3, as
|Ψ−〉 is a −1 eigenstate of the swap operation, and the
other eigenstates of swap have the eigenvalue +1. As
well, |RQ〉 = |Ψ−〉 gives us C = 1 for Q , which implies
that Kσ =
1
2 for all σ ∈ S. Theorem 7 then simplifies to
∣∣ 〈RQ |hαβ〉 ∣∣2 = 1−
∣∣ 〈φβ |φα〉 ∣∣2
2
.
The probability of rejection obtained is then consistent
with the results of [3].
Considering Kσ as a function of C and uσ , the value
C = 1 is the only value for which Kσ is not strictly in-
creasing or strictly decreasing. As a result, the choice
C = 1 plays a somewhat special role in the analysis of
strict one-qubit schemes. One approach to examining
one-qubit fingerprinting schemes is to fix Alice’s distri-
bution of fingerprints, and try to determine which value
of C leads to the best error probability for the scheme as
a whole. Under some reasonable assumptions on Alice’s
choice of states, the value C = 1 (and thus, a symmetric
scheme) is optimal. However, this is not true under more
general assumptions.
Suppose Alice has some fixed choice of fingerprinting
states. Among Alice’s fingerprints, there will be some
pair of states |φα〉 , |φβ〉 which have the largest inner
product of any pair. For one-qubit schemes in canoni-
cal form, in order for an asymmetric scheme to perform
better than a symmetric scheme, we require Kα ,Kβ >
1
2
for this pair of α and β. This is possible only if both uα
and uβ lie within a circle of radius C
−1 about the origin
on the complex plane for C > 1, or outside such a cir-
cle for C < 1. Either of these constraints on the values
of uα and uβ is equivalent to the states |φα〉 and |φβ〉
lying within some circle of lattitude, either closer to |0〉
or to |1〉, on the Bloch sphere. Then, the closer such a
minimally distinguishable pair lies to the equator of the
Bloch sphere, the closer C must be to 1 for these criteria
to apply, and so the closer the optimal scheme will be to
symmetric.
Using this observation, we can determine some neces-
sary criteria on Alice’s choice of fingerprints, in order for
a symmetric scheme to be suboptimal for that choice. For
a minimally distinguishable pair of states |φα〉 and |φβ〉
of Alice’s, if
• one of the pair lies on the equator of the Bloch
sphere,
• the two states lie on opposite sides of the Bloch
equator, or
• two such pairs of minimal distinguishability lie on
opposite sides of the Bloch equator,
then it is easy to show that a symmetric protocol is op-
timal. (In particular, for a scheme where Alice’s states
are optimally spaced on the Bloch sphere, the latter two
conditions will most likely apply.) In order for C > 1
to be optimal, we then require uα and uβ to both lie
within a circle of radius C−1 on the complex plane, and
for
∣∣ 〈φα |φβ〉 ∣∣ to be strictly larger than the inner product
of any other pair. For C < 1 to be optimal, we have
similar requirements, except that uα and uβ must both
lie outside the circle of radius C−1 on the complex plane.
It is easy to find simple choices of fingerprint states
for Alice where a symmetric scheme is not optimal. One
example would be where S = {0, 1, 2}, and we define
Alice’s states by the complex parameters
u0 = 0 ; u1 = 2 ; u2 = −2 .
In this case, the minimally distinguishable pair would be
|φ1〉 and |φ2〉 with an inner product of 35 , compared to 15
for the other two possible pairs. Using Theorem 7 with
the value Kσ =
1
2 for all σ ∈ S, a symmetric scheme Q
with this choice of fingerprints for Alice would have error
probability 1725 = 0.68 . However, the points u1 and u2
both lie outside the circle of radius C−1 on the complex
plane, for any 12 < C < 1. In particular, consider a
scheme QA where C = 1√2 . This choice of C will yield
K0 =
1
3 ; K1 = K2 =
5
9
The higher values for K1 and K2 improve the probability
of error in the worst case at the cost of the probability
of success in other cases. Using Theorem 7 once more,
we may determine the probability of error when α = 1
and β = 2 to be 2945 ≈ 0.644 . It is easy to determine
that this is the error probability of QA. Although this is
not an improvement on the error probability of the strict
8protocol for |S| = 3 presented in Table I, this is better
than in the symmetric protocol QS . Then, for this choice
of fingerprint states for Alice, the schemeQA has a better
worst-case probability of error than a symmetric scheme.
In general, evenly spacing Alice’s states on the Bloch
sphere will lead to a symmetric fingerprinting scheme be-
ing the optimal choice, because there will not be a unique
pair with maximal inner product, and the distribution of
minimally distinguishable pairs will be essentially sym-
metric on the Bloch sphere. However, for an arbitrary
distribution of Alice’s states, a symmetric protocol is not
optimal, and it appears difficult to show that evenly spac-
ing states on the Bloch sphere is an optimal choice with-
out first assuming a symmetric scheme is to be used.
V. CONCLUSION
We have shown that fingerprinting schemes that make
use of only one-qubit messages from Alice and Bob to
the referee can perform better in the worst case than is
possible for any similar classical communication scheme
using single bit messages. This result holds whether one
requires one-sided error (with no false negatives) or one
allows two-sided error probabilities.
For a one-bit fingerprinting scheme, one can never
achieve a better worst-case performance than blind guess-
ing, and one-sided error schemes have error probability
1. The number of inputs for Alice and Bob where the fin-
gerprinting scheme performs “badly” (with a high lower
bound on the error probability) either includes all inputs
where Alice’s and Bob’s string match, or a sizeable frac-
tion of the other possible inputs.
In the quantum case, while some lower bounds exist,
upper bounds for error probability can also be easily de-
rived for one-qubit fingerprinting schemes with one-sided
error, and can be determined from the fingerprint states
of either Alice or Bob alone if the reject state is known.
Using these techniques, it is possible to show that there
are choices of fingerprints for Alice, for which the opti-
mal one-qubit scheme is not symmetric. However, if it is
assumed that Alice distributes her states as evenly over
the Bloch sphere as possible, a symmetric scheme is quite
likely the optimal scheme.
It is more difficult to make clear statements one-qubit
fingerprinting schemes with two-sided error. Although it
is easy to find ones with reasonably low error probability
by converting one-sided error schemes, the structure of
strict schemes is lost: the freedom to reject matching
states with some probability makes simple arguments by
linearity difficult to find.
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APPENDIX: DEFERRED PROOFS
We will now present the two results from the analysis
of strict one-qubit fingerprinting schemes whose proofs
were deferred.
To prove Theorem 5, we will use a number of ideas
introduced originally after the theorem: namely, the idea
of the reject state (defined on page 5), and the idea of
the canonical form of a strict protocol Q (presented on
page 6). These two ideas do not depend on Alice’s and
Bob’s fingerprint states being pure states. We would also
like to use the linear relation of Equation 16, which we
will briefly re-derive here.
Proof of Theorem 5 — Without loss of generality,
Q is in canonical form. Then, let C be a positive real
such that
|RQ〉 = 1√1+C2
( |01〉 − C |10〉)
holds. Next, consider a product state |u〉 |w〉 ∈ AQ . We
may represent the state |u〉 and |w〉 in the form
|u〉 = 1√
1+|u|2
(
|0〉+ u |1〉
)
|w〉 = 1√
1+|w|2
(
|0〉+ w |1〉
)
,
for some complex constants u,w ∈ C. As
〈RQ|
( |u〉 ⊗ |w〉) = 0, we can then determine
w 〈01 |01〉 − Cu 〈10 |10〉 = 0
=⇒ w = Cu .
Considering this, let ρσ ⊗ τσ be some matching state of
Q. Suppose that Alice uses a mixed state for ρσ . Then,
let ρσ be some mixture of the states
|φσ〉 = 1√
1+|uσ |2
( |0〉+ uσ |1〉)
|φ′
σ
〉 = 1√
1+|u′σ |2
( |0〉+ u′
σ
|1〉) ,
and let τσ be a (possibly trivial) mixture including the
state
|ψσ〉 = 1√
1+|wσ|2
( |0〉+ wσ |1〉)
Because |φσ〉 |ψσ〉 and |φ′σ〉 |ψσ〉 are both in AQ , it must
be that wσ = Cuσ and wσ = Cu
′
σ
. This is only possible
if uσ = u
′
σ
, so that |φσ〉 = |φ′σ〉. Then, ρσ is a pure state.
A similar analysis holds for Bob. 
Next, we present the proof of Theorem 7. Implicit in
the proof for the case where uα , uβ ∈ C is a derivation of
the formula for Kσ for canonical schemes that was shown
previously, in Equation 18.
9Proof of Theorem 7 — Without loss of generality,
let Q be in canonical form. Let α 6= β, and let
|RQ〉 = 1√1+C2
( |01〉 − C |10〉) ,
as before. We may express |φα〉 and |φβ〉 in terms of
(extended) complex numbers, as in Equation 15: for in-
stance, we have
|φα〉 = 1√
1+|uα|2
( |0〉+ uα |1〉) ,
and similarly for |φβ〉. In the case where |φα〉 = |1〉,
we set uα = ∞ (using the one-point compactification of
C). We may then use Equation 16 to determine Bob’s
fingerprint states: for instance,
|ψα〉 = 1√
1+C2|uα|2
(
|0〉 + Cuα |1〉
)
,
and similarly for |ψβ〉. Then, we will show that Equa-
tion 17 is satisfied for
Kσ =
C2
(
1 + |uσ|2
)
(
1 + C2 |uσ|2
)(
1 + C2
) . (19)
In the case uσ = ∞, this expression has a well-defined
limit of Kσ =
1
1+C2 .
We have three cases: uα =∞ (in which case uβ ∈ C),
uβ = ∞ (in which case uα ∈ C), and uα , uβ ∈ C. The
first two cases are easy to prove; the last case of uα , ub ∈
C requires a little more analysis. Consider the value of∣∣ 〈φβ |φα〉 ∣∣2 :
∣∣ 〈φβ |φα〉 ∣∣2 = |1+uβ∗uα|2(1+|uα|2)(1+|uβ |2) .
By subtracting both sides of the equation from 1, we
obtain
1 −
∣∣ 〈φβ |φα〉 ∣∣2
=
(1+uα
∗uα)(1+uβ
∗uβ) − (1+uβ∗uα)(1+uα∗uβ)
(1+|uα|2)(1+|uβ |2)
=
|uα−uβ |2
(1+|uα|2)(1+|uβ |2) ,
from which we conclude
|uα−uβ |2
1+|uα|2 =
(
1 + |uβ|2
)(
1 −
∣∣ 〈φβ |φα〉 ∣∣2) . (20)
We will make use of this equality in our analysis of∣∣ 〈RQ |hαβ〉 ∣∣. We may expand the expression for |hαβ〉
in terms of the standard basis:
|hαβ〉 = |00〉+ Cuβ |01〉+ uα|10〉+ Cuαuβ |11〉√
1+|uα|2
√
1 + C2|uβ |2
.
Taking the inner product with |R〉, and squaring the
absolute value, we obtain
∣∣ 〈RQ |hαβ〉 ∣∣2 = C2|uα−uβ |2(1+|uα|2)(1 + C2|uβ |2 )(1+C2) . (21)
Applying Equation 20, we can perform a substitution to
obtain
∣∣ 〈R |hαβ〉 ∣∣2 = C2(1+|uβ |2)(1 + C2|uβ |2 )(1+C2)
(
1 − ∣∣ 〈φβ |φα〉 ∣∣2)
= Kβ
(
1 −
∣∣ 〈φβ |φα〉 ∣∣2) .
The theorem then holds. 
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